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Packet Marking algorithmAbstract Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm suggests a methodology to identify all the par-
ticipated routers of the attack path by probabilistically marking the packets. In this approach, these
marked packets contain partial information regarding the routers of the attack path. At receiver, to
get the complete information of every router, it requires more number of marked packets and hence
more combinations and more false positives. To overcome this drawback we have presented a novel
idea in ﬁnding the exact IP address of the routers in the attack path by applying Chinese Remainder
Theorem. The result of our implementation reveals that our idea requires less number of marked
packets and takes no time in constructing the attack path. The same idea is true even in the case
of multiple attackers.
 2014 Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Information transfer became very easy due to the invention of
Internet. The speed of transmission has been tremendously
increased and along with this, the attack rate has also grownexponentially. An ‘‘attack’’ is deﬁned as a method of creating
obstruction during the transmission of information. Due to the
attacks all authorized persons are unable to retrieve the infor-
mation while unauthorized people are successful in getting the
information.
These attacks are broadly categorized as passive and active
attacks. Generally passive attacks are difﬁcult to detect but to
some extent easy to prevent. Active attacks are difﬁcult to pre-
vent and simple to detect. In the active attacks, one of the most
upsetting and very difﬁcult task is to trace the adversary, called
DOS attack, in which the legitimate people are unable to
access the information. This is due to the intense logging of
redundant packets sent by the attacker. This problem can be
solved by ﬁnding the IP address of the attacker, but the IP
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Figure 1 IPv4 packet format.
716 Y. Bhavani et al.address can be spoofed. Hence the best solution in dealing with
DOS attacks is to ﬁnd the attack path from the victim to the
adversary [10–13]. The process of constructing the attack path
using the information from the received packets is called IP
Traceback.
Different techniques have been proposed for IP Traceback
[2–6] but they all have short comings, such as limit on their
usability in practice. Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm
(PPM) was originally suggested by Burch and Cheswick [1]
and later it was designed and implemented by Savage et al.
[2] to solve the IP Traceback problem. This PPM algorithm
has two procedures one packet marking procedure and second
graph reconstruction procedure. In the packet marking proce-
dure, when a router receives a packet, a random number is
generated and the packets will be marked by comparing it with
the threshold value Pm which is a predeﬁned value. At the vic-
tim, graph reconstruction procedure uses these marked packets
to construct the graph [9]. This approach called as fragment
marking scheme (FMS), and it has a very high computation
overhead at the victim to construct the attack path and when
an attack originates from multiple sources then the false com-
bination rate is high(false positives) which is a major drawback
of this algorithm.
Song and Perrig [3] elucidated an Advanced Marking
Scheme (AMS) to rectify the problem of IP Traceback. This
technique uses the hash value of IP address to encode the pack-
ets rather than the IP address itself. Similar to FMS this has
low network and router overhead. This AMS also has lower
false positive rate and lower computation overhead at the vic-
tim. The major drawback of this algorithm is the victim can
construct the attack path only when he has the map of the
upstream routers.
Dean et al. [4] proposed an Algebraic Traceback Approach
(ATA) which encodes router’s IP address as a polynomial in
Identiﬁcation ﬁeld of IPv4 packet. However this algorithm
does not scale in large number of DDoS attacks. Source Path
Isolation Engine (SPIE) was explicated by Snoren et al. [5].
This could perform Traceback using just a single packet, how-
ever it requires large amount of storage space and hardware
changes for packet logging due to which it is not practically
deployable.
Kiremire et al. [14] made a comparative study of different
PPM algorithms [2–5] in various network topologies. Kiremire
et al. [15] explained that three network-dependent factors
affect different PPM-based schemes uniquely giving rise to a
variation and discrepancy between scheme performances from
one network to another.
Lih-Chyau et al. [7] explained an IP Traceback process
based on Chinese Remainder Theorem. In this paper the IP
address of the routers and remainder values, calculated using
Chinese Remainder Theorem, is sent through the marked
packets. These packets are used to construct the attack path.
When compared to the previous procedures false positive rate
has been reduced to some extent but still have more combina-
tions and hence false positives.
In our present paper, we have proposed a novel idea of
ﬁnding the IP addresses of the attack path, by drastically
reducing the comparisons and also false positives, by applying
Chinese Remainder Theorem on every IP address. The success
rate of ﬁnding the IP addresses of attack path is 96.484375 and
rate of false positives has been signiﬁcantly reduced to
3.515625. Our paper is organized as follows. We haveexplained our proposed procedure for IP Header encoding
using CRT in Section 2 and the corresponding Probabilistic
Packet Marking algorithm using CRT is presented in Section
3. Method for constructing attack path is elucidated in Section
4. Results are shown in Section 5 and the paper is concluded in
Section 6.2. IP Header encoding using CRT
The DOS attacks can be solved by constructing the attack path
there by ﬁnding the source router of the attacker. IP Traceback
is a technique to ﬁnd the IP addresses of the routers in the
attack path. In this section we explain the technique of IP
Traceback by applying Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) states that
X  a1 mod m1
X  a2 mod m2


X  ak mod mk
ð1Þ
where m1, m2, m3, . . ., mk are pair wise relatively prime. Then
the system of congruences X ” ai mod mi where 1 6 i 6 k has
a unique solution modulo M.
According to our proposed methodology at each router, a
unique X value is calculated using CRT for its IP address.
The corresponding X values of every router are sent to the
receiver by placing the X value in the Identiﬁcation ﬁeld of
IPv4 packet header. At the receiver, by applying modular
inverse on X, the IP address of every router can be deduced.
As the value of X is unique, the occurrences of fallacy IP
addresses are drastically reduced.
The main aim of the DOS attack is to ﬁnd the IP addresses
of the routers through which the packets are traversed. The
address of each router cannot be encoded as a whole due to
the limitation of packet header size. The IP packet header for-
mat is shown in Fig 1. The 16 bit Identiﬁcation ﬁeld of IPv4 is
used to store the IP address. As the address of each router is of
32 bits, it cannot be ﬁtted into the identiﬁcation ﬁeld as a
whole. This forced us to fragment the IP address into 4 equal
parts each of 8 bits.
The IP address is split at each dot, into four parts denoted
as IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 (for example the IP address 192.168.0.1 is
split as IP1 = 192, IP2 = 168, IP3 = 0, IP4 = 1). If these frag-
ments are sent as it is (without applying CRT) it will be very
difﬁcult to combine the corresponding fragments of each IP
Identification Field 
Xi X (i+1)mod4
    0                  7 8                 15 
Figure 2 16 bit Identiﬁcation ﬁeld of IPv4.
Aacker
R1 (192.168.0.1) 
R2(192.168.2.1)
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Figure 5 Network topology showing the attack path.
Fragment 0 
X0                                         X1
00111000 11100000 
Fragment 1 
X1                                       X2
11100000 11100101 
 Fragment 2 
X2                                       X3
11100101 00000001 
 Fragment 3 
X3                                    X0
00000001 00111000 
Figure 3 Four fragments X0X1, X1X2, X2X3, X3X0 for an IP
address 192.168.0.1.
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in turn generates wrong IP addresses. Hence a new methodol-
ogy is proposed in our paper to drastically reduce false posi-
tives and to ﬁnd IP addresses of the attack path exactly.
Applying CRT Eq. (1) on these four parts (IP1, IP2, IP3,
IP4) of IP address of each router, a unique value X, which is
congruent modulo to IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4 is calculated as follows.     0           3 4              7 8                   13 14   15 
VER HLEN Fragment number (2 bits)   
Fragment  (16 bits)                     
Distance (5 bits)     PROTOCOL 
SOURCE IP
DESTINATION
OPTIONS
--
DA
---
Figure 4 IPv4 hX  IP1 mod m1
X  IP2 mod m2
X  IP3 mod m3
X  IP4 mod m4
ð2Þwhere we assume values for m1 = 251, m2 = 253, m3 = 255,
m4 = 256.16   17                                                        31 
TOTAL LENGTH 
Flag  
(1  bit) FLAGS FRAGMENT OFFSET 
HEADER CHECKSUM 
 ADDRESS 
 IP ADDRESS 
(IF ANY) 
- 
TA 
- 
eader format.
Table 1 The IP addresses in the attack path and the
corresponding X values.
IP address X value
192.168.0.1 00111000111000001110010100000001
192.168.2.1 01110110111001001010010100000001
192.168.10.1 01110111110111001011010000000001
718 Y. Bhavani et al.Then, X value can be calculated in the following manner
X 
X4
i¼1
IPibi
 !
mod M ð3Þ
where M ¼Q4k¼1mk
bi ¼Mi M1i mod mi; hereMi ¼M=mi
As M= 251 · 253 · 255 · 256, will cover all the IP
addresses belonging to class A, B, C and D.
Due to the IP packet header constraint, a user can send
utmost 16 bits in the Identiﬁcation ﬁeld apart from the remain-
ing header bits. For example for the IP address 192.168.0.1,
IP1 = 192, IP2 = 168, IP3 = 0, IP4 = 1. The X value is calcu-
lated as 954262785 by applying Eq. (3) on the above four
parts of the IP address. The binary format, corresponding to
this X value is 00111000111000001110010100000001 where
X0 = 00111000, X1 = 11100000, X2 = 11100101 andFigure 6 Marked information of fragmX3 = 00000001. In order to properly combine all the parts of
every X value corresponding to each IP address at the receiver,
we are concatenating two successive parts (X0X1, X1X2, X2X3,
X3X0) and each part is placed into the identiﬁcation ﬁeld of
IPv4 as shown in Fig. 2. For the above example the four frag-
ments are shown in Fig. 3.
Each fragment placed in the Identiﬁcation ﬁeld, is sent to
the receiver. The fragment number is placed in the type of ser-
vice (TOS) ﬁeld, and the number of hops from the router to the
victim (distance), in the time to live (TTL) ﬁeld. The TTL ﬁeld
is initially set to twice the number of hops (from routing table)
from the marking router to the victim (see Fig. 4).3. Modiﬁed Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm using CRT
In the PPM algorithm, every IP address is divided into 8 frag-
ments and these fragments are sent through 8 packets. At the
receiver, by combining these fragments, a very large number of
combinations occur and hence more false positives. This draw-
back is addressed in our paper by dividing the IP address into
four fragments only and applying CRT on these fragments to
generate a unique X value, ensuring to reduce the number of
combinations and false positives.
The PPM algorithm has been modiﬁed so that already
marked packet if selected for marking, is not marked again
by introducing a ﬂag ﬁeld. The MPPM procedure is explained
below. When a packet arrives at a router, it generates a ran-ent number, fragment and distance.
IP Traceback through modiﬁed Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm using Chinese Remainder Theorem 719dom number ‘‘rand’’. If rand is less than the threshold marking
probability Pm and if ﬂag ﬁeld is equal to 0, then the packet is
marked. This is done by setting the TOS ﬁeld with the frag-
ment number, identiﬁcation ﬁeld with the fragment (any two
successive parts of X value), TTL ﬁeld with distance and ﬁnally
ﬂag to 1 indicating that it has been marked [8]. When the same
packet is selected to mark by the subsequent router, as the ﬂag
is set to 1, only the distance ﬁeld is decremented keeping the
remaining ﬁelds unaltered. When a ﬂag ﬁeld is 1 the packet
cannot be marked again even though the threshold value is
satisﬁed.
3.1. Marking procedure at router R
Fragno‹ 0
For (each packet pkt received from router R)
{
Generate a random number rand between [0. . .1)
If (rand< Pm and ﬂag= 0) then
pkt.TOS‹ fragno
pkt.TTL‹ 2 · d
pkt.Identiﬁcation‹ X[fragno] + X[(fragno+ 1) mod 4]
fragno‹ fragno mod 4
ﬂag‹ 1
if(ﬂag= 1)
pkt.TTL = pkt.TTL-1Figure 7 Marked information after theThe reconstruction procedure of IP addresses of routers in the
attack path is explained below. When the receiver receives the
marked packets, the following information is extracted from
every packet header. Fragment from Identiﬁcation ﬁeld, frag-
ment number from TOS ﬁeld and distance from TTL ﬁeld are
extracted.
The above information is placed in a table called Restable.
At the receiver there is every possibility of getting the same
fragments encoded into the multiple marked packets. This
duplicate information has been eliminated in order to reduce
the number of comparisons and hence false positives. Let Sd
be the set of routers away from the victim at distance d. The
stored information from the Restable is ordered by the frag-
ment number and distance d then the successive fragments
are compared.
For example, a fragment 0 which is a combination of X1X2
of part of X value, which represents a part of IP address at dis-
tance d is compared against fragment 1, which is a combina-
tion of X2X3 of the same X value, representing another part
of same IP address at distance d. The least signiﬁcant 8 bits
(LS8 bits) of fragment 0 i.e., part X2 is compared with the
Most Signiﬁcant 8 bits (MS8 bits) of fragment 1. If this com-
parison is true then we get ﬁrst 16 bits of X. Similarly X3
(LS8 bits) of fragment 1 is compared with X3 (MS8 bits) of
fragment 2. If this comparison is true, we get another succes-
sive 8 bits of X and hence total 24 bits are received. Next, X4
(LS8 bits) of fragment 2 is compared with X4 (MS8 bits) of
fragment 3. If the above comparison is true, we get the last 8duplicates are removed and ordered.
720 Y. Bhavani et al.bits of X the total bits received are 32 bits. Finally X0 (LS8
bits) of fragment 3 is compared with X0 (MS8 bits) of fragment
0 to further enhance the veriﬁcation process. This ensures that
right parts of X value are properly appended to get correct X
value. From the above step, receiver successfully gets all the
32 bits of a unique X value.
From the X value applying Chinese Remainder Theorem,
all the four parts of IP address can be derived as follows.
IP1  X mod m1
IP2  X mod m2
IP3  X mod m3
IP4  X mod m4
The above parts will be combined properly in the consecu-
tive order and hence IP address can be achieved. Similarly by
combining the fragments properly, from all the received
marked packets, X values can be calculated and thus different
IP addresses of the attack path can be deduced. In the absence
of the network topology, multiple attack paths can be extorted
using real (exact) IP addresses only without any false positives.
3.2. Reconstruction procedure at victim v
Let Restable be a table of tuples(fragno, fragment, distance)
for each packet pkt from attacker
Restable.Insert(pkt.fragno, pkt.fragment, pkt.distance)
if pkt.distance> maxd then
maxd: = pkt.distance
Remove duplicates from the Restable
/* delete from Restable where ID not in (select min(ID) from
Restable group by fragno, fragment, distance) */
Let Sd be empty for 0 6 d 6 maxd
for d: = 0 to maxd
/* Select pkt.fragno, pkt.fragment from Restable pkt, Restable pkt1
where pkt.substr(0,7) = pkt.substr(8,15) and pkt.distance = d
ordered by pkt.fragno */
for all ordered combinations and successive fragments
if(pkt.substring(8,15) = pkt1.substring(0,7)
/* where pkt and pkt1 are two successive fragments */
if(pkt.fragno = 0)
Sd= pkt.fragment
else
Sd=Concatenate(Sd, pkt.substring(8,15))
for d= 0 to maxd
ﬁrstpart= pkt.substring(0,7);
lastpart= pkt.substring(32,40);
if(ﬁrstpart= lastpart)
Xdec = Sd.substring(0, 32)
Convert Xdec from decimal to binary and store in X
/* Find IP1 IP2 IP3 IP4 using CRT */
IP1 = X mod 251
IP2 = X mod 253
IP3 = X mod 255
IP4 = X mod 256
Combined IP address = (IP1. IP2. IP3. IP4)4. Results
In this experimentation, we have considered a linear network
with three routers R1, R2 and R3 as shown in Fig. 5. The IPaddresses of R1, R2 and R3 are assumed as 192.168.0.1,
192.168.2.1 and 192.168.10.1 respectively.Each IP address is
divided into 4 parts. Using Eq. (2), a unique X value corre-
sponding to each IP address is calculated and is shown in
Table 1.
This X value is divided into 4 parts, and each fragment (two
successive parts) along with the fragment number and distance
are sent through a packet. At the receiver, the information
from the TOS, Identiﬁcation and the Time To Live (TTL)
ﬁelds corresponding to fragment number, fragment and the
distance ﬁeld respectively, are extracted from IPv4 packet
header and is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 7 depicts the above information after removal of dupli-
cates. By juxtaposing all the successive fragments with the
same distance ﬁeld, results in 40 bits of X value are as shown
in Fig. 8. For further veriﬁcation of the proper combination
of the four parts of X value, the most signiﬁcant 8 bits and
the least signiﬁcant 8 bits of the X value are compared and if
they are equal, that X value is considered. By applying the
modular inverse on these X values (ﬁrst 32 bits) generate the
exact IP addresses of all the routers in the attack path without
any false positives as shown in Fig. 8.
5. Conclusion
The main aim of IP Traceback technique is to acquire the IP
addresses of the router in the attack path exactly and to con-
struct the attack path back to locate the source router of the
attacker. As it is not possible to send the IP address in a single
packet, we are forced to send the IP address in fragments. The
Savage et al. in their work divided each IP address into 8 frag-
ments and the Lin-Chyau et al. divided each IP address into 5
fragments. At the receiver when there are more fragments for
every IP address there will be more combinations and hence
more false positives.
This drawback made us to reduce the fragments. In our
proposal we divided the IP address into four fragments only
and applied Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) on each IP
address of the attack path. Due to the application of CRT
we are successful in obtaining the exact IP addresses of the
attack path with 96.484375 as success rate. The 100% success
rate could not be achieved due to the following.
1. In IP Header encoding using Chinese Remainder Theorem
the chosen four pair wise relative prime numbers are 251,
253, 255, 256.
2. We are forced to select the above four relatively prime num-
ber due to the division of IP address into four parts and
each part being representable in 8 bits.
3. When the ﬁrst part of the IP address contains a value in
between 251 and 255 and/or if the second part contains a
numeral in between 253 and 255 and/or if the third part
contains 255 we get false positives. Hence the failure (false
positive) rate among 256 · 256 · 256 · 256 IP addresses is
3.515625.
We conclude our paper that exact IP address in the attack
path can be traced out with 96.484375 success rate. If the vic-
tim knows the network topology, then he can construct the
attack path in no time. This is also applicable even in the case
of multiple attackers. Our theme can be further extended to
Figure 8 The 40 bit X values and the IP addresses in the attack path.
IP Traceback through modiﬁed Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm using Chinese Remainder Theorem 721construct the attack path in the absence of information regard-
ing network topology.
References
[1] Burch H, Cheswick B. Tracing anonymous packets to their
approximate source. In: Proceedings of USENIX LISA; 2000. p.
319–27.
[2] Savage S, Wetherall D, Karlin A, Anderson T. Practical network
support for IP Traceback. In: Proc of ACM SIGCOMM
conference; 2000.
[3] Song DX, Perrig A. Advanced and authenticated marking
schemes for IP Traceback. In: Proc of IEEE INFOCOM; April
2001. p. 878–86.
[4] Dean D, Franklin M, Stubbleﬁeld A. An algebraic approach to IP
Traceback. ACM Trans Inform Syst Secur 2001:3–12.
[5] Snoeren AC, Partridge C, Sanchez LA, Jones CE, Tchakountio F,
Kent ST, et al. Hash-based IP Traceback. In: Proc ACM
SIGCOMM; August 2001.
[6] Park K, Lee H. On the effectiveness of probabilistic packet
marking for IP Traceback under denial-of-service attacks. In:
Proc of IEEE INFOCOM; 2001.
[7] Lih-Chyau, Liu Tzong-Jye, Yang Jyun-Yan. IP traceback based
on Chinese Remainder Theorem. In: Proceedings of the sixthIASTED international conference on communications, internet,
and information technology; 2007. p. 214–9.
[8] Bhavani Y, Janaki V, Sridevi R. IP Traceback through modiﬁed
probabilistic packet marking algorithm. In: Proc of IEEE Region
10 conference TENCON 2013; October 2013.
[9] Wong Tsz-Yeung, Wong Man-Hon, Lui Chi-Shing. A precise
termination condition of the probabilistic packet marking algo-
rithm. IEEE Trans Depen Secure Comput 2008;5:6–21.
[10] Goodrich MT. Probabilistic packet marking for large-scale IP
Traceback. IEEE/ACM Trans Network 2008;16:15–24.
[11] Okada M, Kanaoka A, Katsuno Y, Okamoto E. 32-bit AS
number based IP Traceback. In: Proc of ﬁfteenth international
conference on Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiq-
uitous Computing; 2011. p. 628–33.
[12] Kuo Wen-Chung, Chen Yi-Lin, Tsai Shuen-Chih, Li Jung-Shian.
Single-packet IP Traceback with less logging. In: Seventh inter-
national conference on intelligent information hiding and Multi-
Media signal processing; 2011. p. 97–100.
[13] Moreira Marcelo DD, Laufer Rafael P, Fernandes Natalia
Castro, Duarte Otto Carlos Muniz Bandeira. A stateless trace-
back technique for identifying the origin of attacks from a single
packet. In: Proceedings of IEEE international conference on
communications; 2011. p. 1–6.
[14] Kiremire Ankunda R, Brust Matthias R, Phoha Vir V. Using
network motifs to investigate the inﬂuence of network topology
722 Y. Bhavani et al.on PPM-based IP traceback schemes. Comput Network
2014:14–32.
[15] Kiremire Ankunda R, Brust Matthias R, Phoha Vir V. Topology-
dependent performance of attack graph reconstruction in PPM-
based IP traceback. In: Proc of IEEE international conference on
consumer communications and networking conference (CCNC);
2014. p. 363–70.
Y. Bhavani pursuing her Ph.D at J.N.T. Uni-
versity Hyderabad, Telengana, India, com-
pleted her M.Tech degree from Kakatiya
University, Warangal in 2010 and secured
University third rank. She is currently work-
ing as Associate Professor of Information
Technology in KITS, Warangal. Her research
interest are in Network Security and web
security. She has published various research
papers in referred international conferences
and international journals.V. Janaki received Ph.D degree from J.N.T.
University Hyderabad, Andhrapradesh, India
in 2009 and M.Tech degree from R.E.C
Warangal, Andhrapradesh, India in 1988. She
is currently working as Professor of CSE,
Vaagdevi Engineering College, Warangal. She
has been awarded Ph.D for her research work
done on Hill Cipher. Her main research
interest includes Network security, Mobile
Adhoc Networks and Artiﬁcial Intelligence.
She has been involved in the organization as a chief member for var-
ious conferences and workshops. She published more than 20 researchpapers in National and International journals and conferences. She is
Presently supervising nearly 10 scholars for their research.Rangu Sridevi received Ph.D degree from
J.N.T. University Hyderabad, Andhrapra-
desh, India and M.Tech degree from Andhra
University, Vishakapatnam, Andhrapradesh,
India in 2003. She is currently working as
Professor of CSE, JNTUHCEH and also
taken additional charge as Additional Con-
troller of Examinations, JNTUH. Her
research interest is in Network Security. She
has published papers in referred international
journals and referred international conferences. She received Best
Paper Award in International Conference on Cybernetics, Informaticsand Systemics ICSCI-2008. She has been a Co-ordinater for the
Information Security under TEQIP-II Research Lab at CSE Depart-
ment, JNTU College of Engineering Hyderabad.
